

*To Angela,
to the memory of my father,
and to the memory of Max*

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	xix
Introduction	1
1. The subject matter of this work	1
2. Artworks and subjects and objects	2
3. Artworks and artistic complexes	3
4. Essentialism and essential elements of artistic complexes	4
5. The format of this book	8
6. Concluding introductory remarks	8

PART ONE

PRELIMINARY ISSUES RELEVANT TO ESSENTIALIST ABSTRACTION

1. The terms 'Abstract' and 'Abstraction'	13
2. The development of Abstraction in art history	15
3. Levels of Abstraction in art	20
4. The different relation of philosophy and art to the question of the limits of Abstraction in art	26
4.1. The general difference of art and philosophy, and the different relation of each to Essentialist Abstraction	26
4.2. Philosophy and Essentialist art	26
4.3. The non-hierarchical relation of art and philosophy	27
4.4. The complementary relation of art and philosophy in the question of Abstract art's limits	29
5. Modernism and Essentialist Abstraction	29
5.1. Modernism and Essentialism and identity and reflexivity	31

PART TWO

ON SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS AND WORKS OF ART:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND BASIC POINTS OF
RELEVANCE TO ESSENTIALIST ABSTRACTION

Introduction	35
Division I: Singling Something Out, Artistic Identity, and Intentional Actions	
1. Singling something out	39
1.1. Creating, selecting, and specifying objects	40
1.2. Artworks and objects	53
1.3. Singling something out determinately	59
1.4. Singling something out indeterminately	61
1.5. Success and failure in singling something out	64
1.6. Possible lack of clarity in singling something out	66
1.7. Singling out more than one object, but not more than one artwork	66
1.8. Singling something out, the visual arts, and the arts in general	68
2. Artworks and apprehensible objects	69
2.1. Phenomenal and noumenal objects	69
3. The notion of the identity of an artwork	74
3.1. The logical and epistemological aspects of an artwork's identity	76
3.2. The identity of an artwork and phenomenal and noumenal objects	77
4. The minimal conceptual relation of artist to artwork	78
4.1. No artwork without an identity	79
5. Two kinds of required intentional relation of an artist to an artwork	80
5.1. The artist's conscious understanding of each kind of relation	81
5.2. Implicit and explicit claims that certain objects are artworks	81
5.3. Time and intentional relations of an artist to an object meant to be a work of art	81
6. Artworks, aesthetic objects, and intentional actions	82
6.1. Intentional actions and novel artworks	82

7. The liberal notion of the use of objects and the direct and indirect relation of an artist to an object used to make an artwork	83
7.1. Artworks and the products of accidental actions	84
8. The dependence of artworks on artistic intentions and cultural contexts	85
8.1. Abstraction, lack of artistic action, and publicity	86
 Division II: Artists, Objects, and Some Minimum Conditions of Artistic Identity	 89
1. The dependence of artworks on preexistent objects	89
1.1. The minimum number of preexistent objects required to make artworks depends on the metaphysics of personhood	89
1.2. Metaphysics, acts, and objects used in producing art	90
2. That an artwork must be something singled out does not dictate the nature of what is singled out	91
3. The history of an object with which an artwork is meant to be identified	91
4. The dependence of an artwork not meant to be identified with some preexistent object on the artistic use of some preexistent object	92
5. An artwork has its particular identity in spite of any degree of similarity that it has to any other object	92
 Division III: Artistic Identity, Subjects, and Apprehensible Objects	 93
1. The dependence of the identity of an artwork on an apprehensible object	93
1.1. Specification and objects that are meant to be artworks that cannot be apprehended	93
2. The dependence of knowledge of the identity of an artwork on an apprehensible object	93
3. Relevant apprehension of the apprehensible object on which knowledge of the identity of an artwork is dependent	94
3.1. Relevant apprehension of an apprehensible artwork	94
3.2. The dependence of an artwork that is meant to be identified with a non-apprehensible object on an apprehensible object	94

3.3. Understanding the relation of an apprehensible object on which the identity of an artwork is dependent to that identity	95
4. The artistic identity of an artwork and its relevance to the ontology, meaning, and value of an artwork	95
5. The dependence of the identity and the apprehension of the identity of an artwork on a public perceptual object	96
5.1. Privacy and publicity and phenomenal objects	98
5.2. A public perceptual object is necessary but is not sufficient	100
5.3. Apprehensible properties relevant to an artwork's identity	100
5.4. No <i>a priori</i> limitations on public perceptual objects	100
5.5. Art-historical objects and consciousness	101
6. Original and subsequent dependence of artworks on objects	102
7. Embodied artworks	103
7.1. Embodiment, identification of artworks, and sophisticated notions of artworks	104
7.2. Different kinds of appreciation of embodied artworks	106
7.3. Ways of producing embodied artworks	107
8. Non-embodied artworks	107
8.1. Non-embodied artworks and specification	108
8.2. Non-embodied artworks and selection	108
8.3. Non-embodied artworks and perceptible objects	110
9. Awareness and agency and perceptual objects	110
10. Conceptual idealism and works of art	111
11. An artist's presentation of an object to the artworld as an artwork	112
Division IV: Artworks and Kinds of Object	115
1. Artworks and times and places of apprehending them	115
2. An artist's identification of the same artwork with apprehensibly different things	116
3. An artist's identification of a number of works with a number of indistinguishable objects	116
4. The equal identification of an artwork with different objects at the same or different times	117

5. An artist's identification of an artwork with the same object with which another artwork is meant to be identified	118
6. Temporal and atemporal objects	118
7. Artworks and change	118
8. Artworks, artifacts, and physical objects	119
 Division V: Art and the Aesthetic	 121
1. The distinction between art and the aesthetic	121
2. Different sources of aesthetic experience and the possible heterogeneity of aesthetic experience	122
2.1. Perceptual and intellectual objects	122
2.2. The possibility of intellectual aesthetic experience of intellectual objects	123
2.3. Aesthetic experiences, thoughts, and feelings	126
2.4. The possible heterogeneity of aesthetic experience	127
3. Art-historical artworks and kinds of appreciable artistic property	128
3.1. The notion of an artistic property	128
3.2. Appreciation of an artistic property	129
3.3. The notion of an aesthetic property	130
3.4. Artworks and their appreciable properties	131
3.5. The Intentional direction of events of appreciation	131
3.6. Artworks and judgements of artistic value	134
3.7. Artistic interest and the possible expansion of the concept of the aesthetic	134
3.8. Essentialism and the aesthetic	139
4. Factors relevant to the aesthetic value of a work of art	139
4.1. The aesthetic value of artworks identified with artistically-independent objects	140
4.2. Aesthetic value and created artworks	144
4.3. Aesthetic value and participatory artworks	145

PART THREE

ON SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS AND ARTISTIC COMPLEXES:
THE MATERIAL OF ESSENTIALISM

Introduction	147
Division I: Subjects and Objects and Artistic Complexes	149
Introduction	149
1. The concept of an artistic complex	149
1.1. The notion of original dependence	150
1.2. Derived and acceptably derived objects	152
1.3. Relevant objects	154
1.4. Appropriate apprehension	155
1.5. Subjects, relevant objects, and artistic complexes	156
2. The nature of an object or objects on which a work of art is relevantly dependent	158
2.1. A single spatio-temporally continuous perceptual object that can be apprehended in full from a single perspective	159
2.2. A single spatio-temporally continuous perceptual object that cannot be apprehended in full from a single perspective	160
2.3. A number of spatio-temporally continuous perceptual objects distributed in spatial proximity	160
2.4. A number of spatio-temporally continuous perceptual objects distributed over distances from one another	161
2.5–6. Temporally distributed objects	162
2.7. Possibilities for a plurality of objects on which the identity of an artwork is dependent	162
2.8. Artworks and tokens of a type	163
3. Artworks and reproductions or documentation	164
4. Kinds of relevant object and their figuring in artistic complexes	165
4.1. A relevant object with which an artwork is meant to be identified	166
4.2. A relevant object through which an artwork is meant to be identified	168

4.3. A complex relevant object that has an aspect with which an artwork is meant to be identified and an aspect through which an artwork is meant to be identified	169
4.4. A relevant object through which and with which an artwork is meant to be identified	169
4.5. Relevant objects and artistic complexes	170
Division II: Artistic Complexes and Subjects	171
Introduction	171
1. Any artwork is related to consciousness	171
1.1. Consciousness is a necessary condition of the identity of any artwork	171
1.2. Consciousness is a necessary condition of responding to any artwork	172
2. Consciousness and traditional and Essentialist art	173
3. Kinds of conscious event of interest to Essentialism	174
4. Forms of conscious event of interest to Essentialism	175
4.1. Any event of awareness is either Intentional or non-Intentional	176
4.2. Any event of awareness has or lacks structure	178
4.3. The structure of Intentional events is reflexive or irreflexive	178
4.4. Areflexive awareness	179
4.5. Any event of awareness is either monadic or polyadic	179
4.6. First-order awareness	181
4.7. Second-order awareness	181
4.8. The five fundamental forms of conscious event	183
5. Consciousness and Essentialist Abstraction	185
6. Language, consciousness, and Essentialism	186
7. Agency	187
8. Awareness and agency	188
9. Knowing which, knowing that, and knowing what	188
9.1. Knowing which	189
9.2. Knowing that	190
9.3. Knowing what	191

Division III: Artistic Complexes and Objects	193
Introduction	193
1. Identity and difference	194
1.1. The primitive concepts of logical sameness and logical difference	194
1.2. Laws of identity and difference	195
2. Particular identity	197
2.1. Logical identity and particular identity	197
2.2. Particular identity is unique and singular	198
2.3. Haecceity is a core logical property	198
2.4. The laws of objects	198
3. Identity and difference and Essentialism	198
4. Logical space	200
5. Identity and difference and artistic complexes	200
5.1. The delimitation of logical space by artworks and things of relevance to them	200
5.2. Essentialism and the delimitation of logical space	201
6. Artworks, objects, and parts	202
7. Compositional relations and works of art	203
7.1. Simple and complex embodied artworks	203
7.2. Simple and complex specified and non-embodied artworks	204
7.3. Essentialism and compositional relations of objects	205
8. An object either is or is not dependent on awareness to be the object that it is	206
9. Kinds of dependence: identity dependence and type dependence	206
9.1. The difference between identity and identity dependence	207
9.2. Actual and possible awareness of consciousness- dependent objects	208
9.3. The heterogeneity of dependent objects and the events on which they depend	209
9.4. Possible logical and metaphysical equivalence of dependent objects and the events on which they depend	209
9.5. The implicit relation of a conscious event to an object dependent on it	211

10. Identity dependence in general	212
10.1. The implicit relation of an identity-dependent object to a particular time	212
10.2. The timeless use of 'is'	213
10.3. Type-A identity dependence	213
10.4. Type-B identity dependence	215
10.5. Identity dependence and simplicity and complexity	216
11. Type dependence in general	217
11.1. Type-A type dependence	217
11.2. Type-B type dependence	220
11.3. Type dependence and simplicity and complexity	221
12. Singly-dependent objects	222
13. Multiply-dependent objects	222
13.1. Homogeneous multiply-dependent objects	223
13.2. Heterogeneous multiply-dependent objects	223
14. Artworks as wholly or partially dependent objects	223
14.1. Wholly-dependent objects	224
14.2. Partially-dependent objects	224
15. Essentialism and kinds of dependent object	224
16. Kinds of independent object	225
16.1. Generic independence	225
16.2. Particular independence	226
16.3. Biographical independence	227
16.4. Universal independence	228
16.5. Necessary independence	229
17. Essentialism and kinds of independent object	230
Division IV: Artistic Complexes and Subjects and Objects	233
Introduction	233
1. Medium and media	234
1.1. Two notions of a medium	235
1.2. A medium as a means of effecting artworks	236
1.3. A medium as a means of conveying artworks	238
1.4. The restrictive notion of a medium	238
1.5. Media and embodied artworks	239
1.6. Media and effecting a non-embodied artwork that is selected	242
1.7. Language as a medium for effecting artworks	243
1.8. Non-perceptible events as media for effecting objects meant to be artworks	245

1.9. Documentation and reproductions as media for conveying artworks	250
1.10. Media and parts of artworks	250
1.11. Relevant objects as media for conveying artworks	250
1.12. The conceptual linkage of medium and singling something out	251
1.13. Language as a medium that both effects and conveys the identity of an artwork	251
2. Non-perceptible events as media for Essentialist Abstraction	253
2.1. Consciousness, ideational objects, and comprehension of identity	254
2.2. Ideational objects and ideational artworks	257
2.3. The mixed media of Essentialism	259
2.4. Possible uses of consciousness as a medium	260
2.5. Consciousness, art, and philosophy	261
2.6. Agency as a medium	261
3. Meaning and concipients	262
3.1. Meaning and artistic complexes	262
3.2. The concept of a concipient	263
3.3. Essentialism and meaning	264
4. Kinds and forms of Intentional event and essential elements of artistic complexes	265
4.1. Perception and conception	265
4.2. Essentialism and forms of awareness	266
4.3. Things that are relevant to the nature of an Essentialist object	267
5. Cause and effect and change	267
5.1. Change and perceptual objects on which embodied and specified artworks are dependent	267
5.2. Change and temporal art forms	269
5.3. Artworks that intentionally incorporate change	270
5.4. Artworks and Cambridge changes	271
5.5. Origination and termination and works of art	272
6. Artistic complexes and becoming	273
7. Indexicals	274
7.1. Indexicals and awareness	274
7.2. Indexicals and agency	277
7.3. Indexicals and perceptual objects	277
8. Phenomenality and noumenality	277

9. Apprehension and reapprehension	278
10. Space and time	280
11. Continuity, discontinuity, recurrence, and non-recurrence	280
11.1. Contiguous and noncontiguous times	281
11.2. Continuity	282
11.3. Discontinuity	283
11.4. Artworks and continuity and discontinuity	284
11.5. Recurrence	285
11.6. Non-recurrence	286
11.7. Artworks and recurrence and non-recurrence	287
12. Aesthetically essential properties	288
Division V: The Essential Elements of Artistic Complexes	291

PART FOUR

IDENTITY AND SUBJECTS, OBJECTS, AND LANGUAGE:
CONCLUDING REMARKS AS A PREAMBLE TO AN
ESSENTIALIST INVESTIGATION OF THE LIMITS
OF ABSTRACTION

Introduction	295
1. Preliminary observations	295
1.1. Abstraction and subjects	295
1.2. Abstraction and objects: Everything and nothing	297
2. Précis of the principles of Essentialist Abstraction	298
3. Identity and Essentialist Abstraction	300
3.1. The relation of artist and audience to an artwork's identity	300
3.2. Identity and essential elements of artistic complexes	301
4. Ideational objects and Essentialist Abstraction	301
5. Comprehension of identity, language, and Essentially Abstract artworks	303
5.1. Non-perceptible events, ideational objects, and specification	304
5.2. Specification and perceptual and non-perceptual ideational objects	307
5.3. Specification and Essentialist Abstraction	308

6. The relation of the identity of an Essentially Abstract artwork to things that are used to effect that identity	309
7. Concluding remarks: Essentialism and its objects	313
7.1. Essentialism and the essential elements of artistic complexes	314
7.2. Additional Essentialist considerations	316

APPENDICES

Appendix I On the Notions of Object, Property, Haecceity, and Diversity	321
1. Objects and Properties	321
2. Haecceity and Diversity	330
Appendix II Leibniz's Law, the Laws of Identity and Difference, and the Identity of Indiscernibles	335
1. Leibniz's Law—A Conceptual Consideration	335
2. The Laws of Identity and Difference	340
3. The Identity of Indiscernibles	343
Appendix III Distinction, Discrimination, and Distinguishability	351
Appendix IV Impossible Objects	353
1. Definition of impossible object	353
2. Different views of impossible objects	354
3. Impossible objects and the laws of thought—I	356
4. Different views of the relation of impossible objects to consciousness	359
5. Impossible objects as Type-A type-dependent objects	360
6. Type dependence and sameness	361
7. The relation of impossible objects to events of conceiving of them	363
8. Impossible objects and the laws of thought—II	364
9. Saying something and saying something true	364
10. Impossible objects, the laws of objects, and Abstraction	365
Works Cited in the Text and Selected Bibliography	367
Index	375

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